This paper presents evidence which challenges the view that techniques which are designed to measure the social preferences of subjects can always be accomplished in a nonintrusive manner. We …nd evidence that such measurements can in ‡uence the preferences which they are designed to measure. Researchers often measure social preferences by posing a series of dictator game allocation decisions; we use a particular technique, Social Value Orientation (SVO). In our experiment we vary the order of the SVO measurement and a lager stakes dictator game. We …nd that subjects with prosocial preferences act even more prosocially when the SVO measurement is administered …rst, whereas those with sel…sh preferences are una¤ected by the order of the measurement. Additionally, we …nd evidence that this di¤erence is driven by the presence of choices involving the size of surplus.
Introduction
Ideally, an experimenter measures the preferences of a subject in order to make predictions regarding behavior. It is commonly thought that such a measurement could be done in a nonintrusive manner: that the measurement does not a¤ect the preferences which they are designed to measure and hence behavior would be identical whether or not the measurement was made. In this paper, we present evidence which challenges this view.
It is known that many subjects do not simply maximize their own material payo¤s. 1 Speci…cally, it is often observed that some subjects will sacri…ce their own material payo¤s so that other subjects will receive a better material outcome. Researchers often attempt to infer the nature of these social preferences by posing a series of allocation decisions, often referred to as dictator games. These decisions entail a choice of an allocation of hypothetical or small material outcomes distributed between the subject and another subject. A speci…c measurement technique, which we use here, is Social Value Orientation (SVO).
If SVO does not a¤ect preferences then the order of the measurement should not matter to our results. If, however, SVO does a¤ect preferences then the order will matter to our results.
In our experiment we vary the order of the measurement of SVO and a standard, lager stakes dictator game. 2 While we …nd that the measure of SVO is signi…cantly related to behavior in the dictator game, we also …nd that the mapping between the measurement of SVO and behavior in the dictator game is related to the timing of the measurement. Speci…cally, we …nd that the subjects, for whom SVO indicates prosocial preferences, act even more prosocially when the SVO measurement is administered …rst. By contrast, we …nd that the subjects for whom the SVO suggests sel…sh preferences are una¤ected by the order of the measurement.
These results suggest that measuring social preferences, through techniques such as SVO, might a¤ect the preferences which they are designed to measure.
To help identify possible causes of the result above, we also run the identical experiment with the exception that the dictator game is such that the relative price of each allocation is 1 to 3 rather than the standard 1 to 1. In other words, each $0.50 kept by the subject reduces the recipient's payo¤s by $1.50. In this case, we …nd no signi…cant di¤erence between the prosocials who have SVO measured before the dictator game and the prosocials who have SVO measured after the dictator game. This suggests that decisions involving the creation of surplus in the measurement of SVO are important to the endogenous nature of the social preferences of the prosocials.
Social Value Orientation as a Measure of Social Preferences
We measure social preferences through SVO because the measure is relatively easy to administer and interpret. The technique (adapted from Van Lange et. al. 1997 ) consists of 9 items with three possible choices involving material payo¤s accruing to the subject and another subject. 3 Each of the nine items has an individualistic response, a prosocial response and a competitive response. The individualistic response is the one in which the material payo¤s accruing to oneself are the largest. In other words, selecting the individualistic choice suggests that the subject neither positively nor negatively values material payo¤s accruing to the other subject. The prosocial response is the one in which the sum of the material payo¤s accruing to both the subject and the other subject are the largest. In other words, selecting the prosocial response suggests that the subject positively values material payo¤s accruing to the other subject. The competitive response is the one in which the di¤erence between the material payo¤s accruing to the subject and the other subject are the largest. In other words, selecting the competitive choice suggests that the subject negatively values material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
Translated into a utility function, SVO measures the form of:
where x own is the material payo¤ accruing to self, x other is the material payo¤ accruing to another person and f and g are increasing functions. A prosocial choice indicates that > 0, an individualistic choice suggests that = 0 and a competitive choice suggests that < 0.
Further, there is much written on the stability of SVO. For instance , Bogaert et. al. (2008) suggest that over the 40 years since its introduction by Messick and McClintock (1968) , it has been widely regarded as providing a stable measure of a personality trait. However, recent 3 See the appendix for a complete description of the SVO items. work has suggested instances where SVO can be a¤ected by the setting and is thereby a less than perfectly stable measure. 4 Iedema and Poppe (1994) show that the measurement of SVO can be a¤ected by self-presentation e¤ects. Smeesters et. al. (2003) show that priming certain types of behavior can lead to a di¤erent mapping from SVO to behavior. While SVO is considered relatively stable, to our knowledge there is no work suggesting that the measurement of SVO can a¤ect the preferences which they are designed to measure.
It is obviously problematic that taking a measurement might a¤ect the quantity it is designed to gauge because a measure is primarily useful to the extent that it can form a basis of making predictions about behavior. This is certainly the case with SVO as it has been used to study behavior in games (Parks, 1994; Kramer et. al., 1986; Pruyn and Riezehos, 2001 ), the decision to use public transportation ( Van Vugt et. al., 1996) , proenvironmental behavior (Cameron et. al., 1998; Joireman et. al., 2001 ) and volunteerism (McClintock and Allison, 1989) SVO also appears in the economics literature. 5 However each of these papers uses the ring measure, which is slightly di¤erent than the technique which we use. The ring measure consists of 24 pair-wise items rather than 9 items with 3 choices. However, similar to the technique which we employ, the ultimate objective is to classify subjects as one of a few types.
Relatively little is known about the relationship between the ring measure and the measure which we employ (Bogaert et. al., 2008) . However, we opt for the latter as it requires fewer responses and is more transparent. As a result of these characteristics, we conjecture that the e¤ects which we …nd here would only be strengthened by using the ring measure.
Finally, measuring social preferences via dictator games, like SVO, has the advantage that it only considers a situation where strategic issues are absent. Although all decisions would be made in the absence of the feedback of the actions of other dictators, it still remains possible that the subject would anticipate some reciprocal arrangement. Therefore, similar to Carpenter (2005), we employ a triadic design whereby each dictator decides an allocation involving self and another dictator. However, this other dictator does not decide on an allocation involving the original dictator but rather on a third dictator.
Other Measures of Social Preferences
Another commonly used social preference measurement technique is GARP as developed by Andreoni and Miller (2002) . SVO is similar to GARP in that both techniques pose a series of dictator games however there remain important di¤erences. In GARP, choice is much less restricted than in SVO. Each SVO item has only three possible responses, whereas each GARP item seeks an allocation of tokens ranging from 40 to 100. As a result, GARP yields less coarse data than SVO. However, the choice in GARP is less transparent than SVO, as the latter explicitly lists the material allocation of each choice. We are not aware of a study which compares the relative merits of the two measures.
Charness and Rabin (2002) pose a series of simple games to learn the speci…c form of social preferences 6 related to relative wealth and reciprocity. The nature of the social preferences might depend on whether other's payo¤s are higher than or lower than the subject's own payo¤s therefore Charness and Rabin vary this aspect of their items. By contrast, in SVO the subject decides among choices where monetary payo¤s accruing to self are never less than that accruing to the other subject. Also, in contrast the technique employed in Charness and Rabin, SVO is not equipped to evaluate preferences for reciprocity.
Endogenous Social Preferences and Behavioral Spillovers
Our paper is related to the study of endogenous social preferences. For instance, Carpenter (2005) and Canegallo et. al. (2008) investigate how the environment can a¤ect preferences. 7 By contrast, we study whether a subject's own response to a measurement instrument can a¤ect subsequent behavior. In this sense, we are closely related to Guth et. al. (2008) . These authors …nd that subjects who contribute more in a public goods game are signi…cantly more trusting in a subsequent investment game.
There also exists a strand of literature which examines the role of the environment on play in games. For instance , Bednar et. al. (2009) describe an experiment in which subjects simultaneously play two distinct games with di¤erent opponents. The authors …nd that behavior in a particular game is a¤ected by corresponding paired game. 8 This literature contends that strategies which are used in one game are often applied to the other, despite that the games should be played independently.
Although the line between the endogenous social preferences literature and the behavioral spillovers literature can be imprecise, we describe our paper as the former because SVO is explicitly designed to measure social preferences.
2 Study 1
Overview
We seek to better understand the e¤ects which dictator-type measurements of social preferences can have on subjects. If these measures do not a¤ect preferences then the order of the measurement should not matter to the results. If, however, the measures do a¤ect preferences then the order will matter to the results.
Procedure
A total of 96 students from Rutgers University-Camden participated in Study 1. The subjects were given course credit for attendance and were told that that a randomly selected 25% from each session would be paid the amount earned from the experiment. The subjects completed a measure of SVO and decided on an allocation in a standard $10 dictator game.
The subjects were aware of the triadic design as they were told to make allocation decisions involving themselves ("You") and another subject ("Other1"). Another subject ("Other2") was to make allocations involving Other2 and You. Therefore, the amount accruing to each subject was what was kept in the You-Other1 allocation decisions plus what Other2 did not keep in the Other2-You allocation decisions. In both the measurement of SVO and the choice in the dictator game, the status of You, Other1 and Other2 would remain …xed.
The measurement of SVO entailed the nine items from Van Lange et. al. (1997) . For the measurement of SVO, the amount the subject could earn ranged from $0.94 to $1.06. Also the subject could send an amount which ranged from $0.19 to $0.94. The subjects were not told these amounts, however they could be calculated with relative ease. The dictator game 8 Also see Bednar and Page (2007) , Crawford and Broseta (1998) and Van Hyuck et. al. (1993). was presented to the subjects in $0.25 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which of the 41 dictator game allocations they most preferred.
In each trial, approximately half of the subjects answered the SVO items then made a choice in the dictator game. We refer to this treatment as SVO First. Approximately half responded to the dictator game then answered the SVO items. We refer to this treatment as SVO Last.
Results
Using the procedure of Van Lange et. al. (1997) , we categorized 32 subjects (33%) as prosocial, 39 subjects (41%) as individualists and 5 subjects (5%) as competitors. There were 20 subjects (21%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6 choices of a particular type. The prosocial subjects kept signi…cantly less than did the proself (individualists and competetors) subjects (t = 5:54; p < 0:01). 9 While unclassi…ed subjects kept less than proself subjects (t = 1:902; p = 0:067) and prosocial subjects kept less than unclassi…ed subjects (t = 1:393; p = 0:0880).
9 In this paper, all given p-values are for one tail.
Additional evidence that SVO su¢ ciently predicts behavior comes from the relationship between the consistency of the SVO responses and the choice in the dictator game. A measure equaling 9 indicates perfect consistency in the set of responses and a measure between 6 and 8 indicates a less than perfectly consistent set of responses. See Table 3 Among those classi…ed as prosocial, those with a measure equal to 9 kept a signi…cantly smaller share than those with a measure between 6 and 8 (t = 3:7667; p < 0:01). Also, among those classi…ed as individualistic, those with a measure equal to 9 kept a signi…cantly larger share than those with a measure between 6 and 8 (t = 2:561; p < 0:001). Therefore, we are reasonably con…dent in the SVO measure as a predictor of behavior in the dictator game.
As our primary objective is to learn whether the mapping from the measure of SVO to behavior depends on the order of the measurement, we now compare dictator allocations given the treatment. First, the di¤erence between the amount kept in the SVO First treatment (mean=$6:036) and in the SVO Last treatment (mean=$6:160) is not signi…cant (t = 0:228; p = 0:4099). However, a signi…cant relationship emerges when one looks within SVO classi…cations. See Figure 4 and Table 1 Study 2 follows the same procedure as Study 1 with the exception that, rather than using a standard dictator game, we use a dictator game in which the relative allocation "price" is 1 to 3. In other words, the most sel…sh allocation is $10 to self and $0 to other and the most generous allocation is $30 to other and $0 to self. This somewhat nonstandard dictator game has the advantages that 1. the amount of total surplus is a matter of choice and 2.
being sel…sh is now relatively costly. If we …nd that the timing has a reduced in ‡uence on the prosocials then we favor the former explanation. If we …nd that individualists are now a¤ected by the timing then we will favor the latter explanation.
Procedure
A total of 90 students from Rutgers University-Camden participated in Study 2. The procedures in Study 2 are identical to that in Study 1 with the exception of the form of the dictator game. Rather than the standard dictator game in which the trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other payo¤s is 1 to 1, the dictator game used in Study 2 has a trade-o¤ of 1 to 3. In other words, to increase the amount kept by $0.50, the subjects must reduce the amount sent to the other subject by $1.50. The subject's own payo¤s were listed in $0.50 increments and the other subject's payo¤s were listed in $1.50 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which of the 21 dictator game allocations they most preferred.
Results
Again using the procedure of Van Lange et. al. (1997) , we categorized 44 subjects (49%) as prosocial, 34 subjects (38%) as individualists and 4 subjects (4%) as competitors. There were 8 subjects (9%) who we could not classify as they did not select a minimum of 6 choices of a particular type. We …nd that the SVO measure predicts behavior across both treatments. See Table 6 for the amount kept across both treatments.
Prosocial Unclassi…ed Proself
Average Amount Kept in Dictator Game 6:4432 6:0625 8:2763
(7:7583) (14:3884) (5:4283) Table 6 : Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classi…cation with variance in parentheses The prosocial subjects kept signi…cantly less than did the proself (individualists and competetors) subjects (t = 3:24; p < 0:01). As in Study 1 we …nd that the consistency of the response is related to the choice in the dictator game. See Table 7 to see the amount kept across both treatments by the consistency of the measurement. Table 7 : Average amount kept in dictator game by SVO classi…cation and consistency of measurement with variance in parentheses Similar to Study 1, among those classi…ed as prosocial, subjects with a measure equal to 9 kept a signi…cantly smaller share than subjects with a measure between 6 and 8 (t = 2:1203; p = 0:0199). However in contrast to Study 1, among those classi…ed as individualistic, subjects with a measure equal to 9 did not keep a signi…cantly di¤erent amount than subjects with a measure between 6 and 8 (t = 0:5248; p = 0:302).
Prosocial Individualistic
Finally, we may ask whether the timing matters for dictator game in Study 2. Unlike Study 1, the di¤erence between the amount kept in the SVO First treatment (mean=$6:705) and in the SVO Last treatment (mean=$7:641) is signi…cant (t = 1:570; p = 0:060). 
Discussion
The main result in Study 1 provided evidence that the measurement of social preferences is not always done in a nonintrusive manner. We …nd that the timing matters for prosocials but not for individualists. Speci…cally, we …nd that prosocial subjects in the SVO First treatment keep signi…cantly less in the standard dictator game than prosocials in the SVO Last treatment. In Study 2 we …nd that there is no signi…cant di¤erence between the SVO First and SVO Last treatments for either prosocials or individualists. From this we infer that the results in Study 1 are driven by the presence of choices involving the creation of surplus.
The choice of the size of surplus is present in both stages of Study 2 but only one stage in Study 1.
Concluding Comments
In this paper, we describe two studies in which we measure social preferences through Social Value Orientation (SVO) and observe the choice in a dictator game. In Study 1 we vary the order of the SVO measurement and the play of the standard dictator game. There, we …nd evidence that subjects with prosocial preferences act more prosocially when the SVO measurement is taken …rst. On the other hand, our evidence suggests that subjects with individualistic preferences are not a¤ected by the order of the measurement. These results imply that measuring social preferences, through techniques such as SVO, might a¤ect the preferences which they are designed to measure.
An explanation for the main result in Study 1 is not obvious. To gain some insight on the matter, Study 2 performs the identical procedure as in Study 1 with the exception that the dictator game exhibits a 1 to 3 trade-o¤ between own payo¤s and other payo¤s (the standard dictator game has a 1 to 1 trade-o¤). We …nd no signi…cant di¤erence between those making dictator game decisions before SVO and those making dictator game decisions after SVO, for prosocials or individualists. Study 2 suggests that the result of Study 1 is driven by the presence of decisions regarding the size of the surplus. This e¤ect, which seems to only in ‡uence the prosocials, are absent in the standard dictator game.
It is worth re ‡ecting on the limitations of the present experimental design. For instance, we cannot determine whether the SVO measurement a¤ects dictator game choices, dictator game choices a¤ects the SVO measurement or perhaps both. Also, our results suggest that the preferences of individualists are less malleable than the preferences of prosocials but this could be a result of our experimental design. For instance, it could be that the optimal choice of many individualists involves a corner solution at the most sel…sh allocation. Finally, SVO only measures social preferences when one receives a larger share than the other subject. The signi…cance of this detail is not clear. Hopefully, future work will shed light on these issues. 
